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Differing worldviews give interdisciplinary work value. However, these same 
differences are the primary hurdle to productive communication between 
disciplines. Here, we argue that philosophical issues of metaphysics and 
epistemology subserve many of the differences in language, methods and 
motivation that plague interdisciplinary fields like educational neuroscience. 
Researchers attempting interdisciplinary work may be unaware that issues of 
philosophy are intimately tied to the way research is performed and evaluated in 
different fields. As such, a lack of explicit discussion about these assumptions 
leads to many conflicts in interdisciplinary work that masquerade as more 
superficial issues. To illustrate, we investigate how philosophical assumptions 
about the mind (specifically the hard problem of consciousness and mind-body 
problem) may influence researchers in educational neuroscience. The methods 
employed by researchers in this field are shaped by their metaphysical beliefs, 
and arguments around these issues can threaten accepted disciplinary 
ontologies. Additionally, how a researcher understands reduction in the special 
sciences and how they place their colleagues in this ontology constrains the 
scope of interdisciplinary projects. In encouraging researchers to explicitly 
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discuss the philosophical assumptions underlying their research we hope to 
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Interdisciplinary work is increasingly important and valued in academia. The 
questions of greatest practical importance today are rarely discipline-specific 
and can be investigated using many different methods. When considering 
questions that affect humanity broadly – such as those concerning health, 
international affairs, environment, education, or resources – the complex and 
systemic nature of these questions necessitates the ideas and methods from 
many different disciplines come together and develop comprehensive solutions. 
The possibility for the success of interdisciplinary work is evident from a 
growing body of publications and journals dedicated to combining two or more 
fields, such as npj Science of Learning (journal which pools research from 
neuroscience, psychology, and education in order to explore human learning), 
and the World Review of Science, Technology, and Sustainable Development (a 
journal which pools ideas from chemistry, economics, and urban development in 
order to explore sustainable development). 
 
In this paper, we use the term “interdisciplinary” broadly; as that which involves 
sharing of information and frameworks specific to qualitatively different 
academic fields in an attempt to answer a common question. The most difficult 
and relevant instances of this to our discussion are cases of transdisciplinary 
projects where discipline specific knowledge must be synthesised and a new 
language and set of methodologies must be created as an integration of the 
relevant disciplines [1]. However, researchers engaging in all forms of multi-
disciplinary collaboration (along the continuum from multidisciplinary, 
interdisciplinary to transdisciplinary practice) will benefit from the discussion 
herein.   
 
Funding bodies recognize the importance of communication between disciplines 
in addressing complex problems and incentivise these endeavours by requiring 
researchers to work together for many competitive grant applications. The major 
funding bodies for science research in the USA and Australia, namely the 
National Institute for Health (NIH), National Health and Medical Research 
Council (NHMRC), and Australian Research Council (ARC), all encourage 
interdisciplinary research. In June 2016, out of a total of 1093 active grant calls 
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for research at the NIH, 21.0% mentioned the word multidisciplinary, 13.9% 
mentioned the word interdisciplinary, 2.8% include the word cross-disciplinary, 
and 3.8% mentioned transdisciplinary research. In total, 31.5% of grant calls for 
the NIH included the terms cross-, multi-, inter-, or trans-disciplinary research 
(http://grants.nih.gov/Grants/guide/). Additionally, the ARC has a $10,000 prize 
awarded yearly to a successful interdisciplinary team (The Eureka Prize). 
Working together has become a lucrative business.   
 
More importantly, interdisciplinary work is necessary for effectively translating 
“basic” research, which resides between experts and academics, to more 
practical applications relevant for policymakers, practitioners and the public. In 
order to make one’s research publically relevant, theories need to actively move 
beyond the simulated lab environments and into more ecologically valid social 
spheres. The NHMRC in Australia, for example, includes research translation into 
policy and practice as one of three factors used to prioritize funding of grant 
applications in health. 
 
Despite its grand aims, successful interdisciplinary research still has its 
obstacles, and doing it successfully requires a reflective team willing to devote 
the time necessary to accommodate the values of the other disciplines and 
researchers. By virtue of coming from different perspectives, there will 
necessarily be disagreements and misunderstandings that require negotiation.  
This process is made worse through a lack of ‘brokers’ who can effectively 
translate from one disciplinary context to another [2]. Awareness of 
epistemological pluralism, or the idea that there are multiple valuable ways of 
‘knowing’ that come from various disciplines, can help us negotiate and 
accommodate the methodological requirements of the various disciplines in 
working towards the same goal [3]. 
 
Philosophical bases for this plurality are often undiscussed in the context of a 
particular interdisciplinary project [4]. For example, medical researchers might 
assume positive realism, which claims that there is an epistemically accessible 
reality that can be empirically studied, and resort to hypothesis driven 
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experimental research to objectively access knowledge about the question. On 
the other hand, humanities-based researchers are more likely to rely on a 
constructivist viewpoint, which holds that reality is relative to a time, place and 
perspective, and adopt qualitative methodologies which accept and invite 
subjective approaches [1]. In approaching one question, the realist approach 
may be seen as overly reductionist by the humanities researcher whilst the 
constructivist methods may be seen as confused and confounded by the medical 
researcher. Collaborating on a frame that both parties are satisfied with can be 
difficult. 
 
Here, we argue that philosophical assumptions that differ between fields and 
individuals impact how research is conducted and contribute to conflicting 
approaches when attempting interdisciplinary projects. Further, we claim that 
specific beliefs about the way the world is and beliefs about the ways in which 
knowledge can be accessed (metaphysics and epistemology) trickle up from 
unconscious sources to change how research, the methods used in approaching a 
specific question and the motivations for performing research are interpreted 
and conveyed. We will use a specific example of an interdisciplinary field of 
research about educational neuroscience (otherwise referred to broadly as 
Science of Learning), which spans (at least explicitly) the disciplines of 
neuroscience, psychology and education. However, these issues are not specific 
to this case study, and an argument for this will be elaborated after we establish 
the relevance of philosophy to interdisciplinary discussions in this field. It is, 
perhaps, worth noting here that the aim of this exploration is not to provide 
concrete methods by which to bridge the gap between varied philosophies – it is 
merely to highlight the consequences differing beliefs may have on 
interdisciplinary work and suggest that an explicit discussion of these issues is 
warranted early in the translation process. 
 
What is the nature of interdisciplinarity in educational neuroscience?  
 
The Science of Learning (SoL) is an interdisciplinary field (also known as 
educational neuroscience; mind, brain and education; learning sciences, etc.), 
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which is an effort to translate insights about the brain and mind to enhance 
practices in the classroom. As the organ of learning, the brain is an obvious place 
to search for answers about the biological bases for learning [5]. Questions about 
the viability of the field in developing successful educational interventions are 
under longstanding and heated debate [5-16] with laborious and detailed 
suggestions for successful collaboration from even the most fervent advocates of 
the integration.  
 
Topics of relevance to this field range from molecular studies of mechanisms for 
long-term potentiation (the cellular mechanism for memory), to mouse models 
for reinforcement learning, human brain network analysis during simple 
perceptual tasks, psychological discrimination tasks, reaction time in complex 
reasoning tasks, emotional regulation, social psychology in the classroom, 
pedagogical evaluation and recommendations, and educational policy 
formulation and evaluation. Working between some of these fields is relatively 
straightforward. For example, moving from brain imaging studies of a perceptual 
task to psychological discrimination theories does not require a distal inference 
to be made. However, trying to integrate cellular mechanisms for memory with 
prescriptive policy recommendations is vastly more difficult. Anderson [17] 
referred to the possibility of making such distant inferences as a ‘seven orders of 
magnitude problem’. There is inherent difficulty in attempting to infer from a 
phenomenon that occurs in a small part of the brain over millisecond time 
periods to the education of a professional, for example, that takes many years 
and occurs in a complex social milieu [18]. The complexity of this translation 
task results in confusion and possible conflict stemming from differences in 
language, methods and motivation at each of the layers of interpretation 
between the brain and broader society. Ultimately, researchers in this area come 
together to better understand and promote learning, so improving 
communication amongst these disciplines will further this aim. Actively engaging 
in dialogue with the aim of uncovering philosophical bases for differences in 
research practice is one way to facilitate productive and empathetic 
communication. 
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The Hard Problem of Consciousness  
 
Issues of philosophy that matter to Educational Neuroscience 
 
To many researchers and empirical scientists, philosophy seems irrelevant and 
outdated [19]. To a philosopher, debates surrounding the nature of the mind 
have ancient origins (for instance in Plato’s Phaedo, or Parmenides [20]) but are 
alive and ongoing today [21-25]. Here, we will give background to some of the 
philosophical issues that are most relevant to the Science of Learning. 
 
The mind-body problem 
 
The mind-body problem is, in essence, a question about the relationship between 
what we normally call mental phenomena and physical phenomena. Here, 
mental phenomena will include thoughts, emotions and sensations like pain and 
hunger. By physical phenomena, we mean things made of matter that interact by 
physical laws. As Ludwig notes [23], there is no consensus amongst philosophers 
about the appropriate answer to this question. All of the solutions seem 
unacceptable for one reason or another. Throughout the years, many scholars 
have claimed to have “solved” this problem, some arguing for a “new” way of 
approaching it based on advancing scientific methods [26, 27], some claiming 
that there is no problem to solve [28], or that it can’t be solved and we should 
make our peace with it [29]. What is clear is that the discussion is ongoing but 
this is rarely recognised when studies examining the brain are interpreted for 
use by educators.  
 
The mind-body problem can be characterized as a puzzle stemming from the 
inconsistency of four premises:  
1) Realism: there are things that have mental properties; 
2) Conceptual Autonomy: mental properties are irreducible to non-mental 
properties, and following, non-mental properties do not entail mental 
properties;  
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3) Constituent explanatory sufficiency: a description of something’s’ 
constituent parts and their interactions is sufficient for a complete 
description of the thing;  
4) Constituent non-mentalism: basic constituents do not have mental 
properties [23].  
 
Each of these premises is, prima facie, true. We constantly use mental states as 
explanations for our own behaviours and reasoning about the behaviours of 
others. Premise two is supported by the idea of a philosophical zombie – that is, 
it is conceivable that there is a being that acts just as we do, responds to 
questions and situations in all the same ways, but doesn’t have a mental life or 
‘experience’ the world. It is also supported by the understanding of a mental 
being that does not have a physical form, such as a ghost or God. Physicality does 
not seem to necessitate mentality, and vice versa. Premise three is simply a 
description of the activities of reductionist science. It is common practice to 
describe the causal relationships of all the parts to describe and understand the 
properties of the whole. Lastly, premise four seems plausible because physicists 
can explain the activity of fundamental particles without referring to mental 
properties. 
 
However, the problem arises because premises 2-4 entail the negation of 
premise 1. The set is inconsistent. The premises cannot all be true together. The 
chosen way to solve this problem (or rather, which premise is given up and why) 
will change how research involving the mind and brain is approached.  
 
To reject premise 1 is to take an eliminativist position, akin to eliminative 
materialists. Eliminative materialists assert that while mental language or folk 
psychological explanations for human behaviours might be used, they are flawed 
ways of understanding the world as they theorize about the existence of an 
unobserved property. These states, eliminativists say, will not be explained by 
any state of a physical system because they are ‘wrong’ kinds of concepts to 
begin with.  
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Denying the second premise leads one to assert that the mental is reducible to 
the physical. That when we talk about someone being sad, or in pain, what we 
really mean is that their body is in a state that we label sadness or pain. This 
stance includes types of monism (that the mind and body are of the same 
material, be it metaphysically physical or not), identity theories (that there is a 
1:1 mapping between states of the mind and states of the brain) and 
functionalism (which appreciates multiple realisability; i.e. that multiple physical 
states could map to one mental state).  
 
Rejecting the third premise results in emergentism. This stance claims that while 
there is nothing more to the mental than the physical, mental properties arise 
out of complex integration of the constituent parts in ways that are 
unpredictable from the sum of the parts and their interactions. In other words, 
the mental is different from and comes from the constituent physical parts, but 
cannot be reduced to explanations at the physical level (material emergentism).  
 
The final premise is the claim that the non-reducible components of the universe 
do not have mental properties. To negate this premise is to claim that the mental 
and the physical are neither the same, nor does one come from the other, but 
rather that mental properties are a fundamental property of the universe. One 
such position is panpsychism, which claims that everything is, at some level, 
conscious. 
 
For our purposes, the primary division in the views individuals hold is the 
classical physicalism vs non-physicalism. Specifically, by this we mean to 
highlight those who think that looking at the state of the brain tells us something 
about the state of the mind (physicalism) from those who believe that the mind 
is fundamentally different than the brain and should be studied in other ways 
(non-physicalism). Whether an eliminative materialist, an identity theorist or a 
functionalist on one side and a dualist or emergentist on the other, differences in 
basic assumption shape how researchers approach educational neuroscience. 
Thus, delving into the ways in which researchers from different disciplines 
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conceive of the relationship between the brain and the mind is an important task 
underpinning the transdisciplinary endeavour. 
 
The hard problem of consciousness 
 
The mind-body relationship is primarily a question of metaphysics; the way the 
world is. A tangential but related problem, termed “the hard problem” of 
consciousness was made popular by the philosopher David Chalmers in a paper 
called “Facing up to the problem of consciousness” [30]. The hard problem of 
consciousness is primarily a problem of epistemology; how we access knowledge 
about the world and the limits of this accessibility. The seminal question posed 
by Thomas Nagel motivating this question was “What is it like to be a bat?” [31], 
where he explained that the most important and interesting question of 
consciousness is the question of the subjective character of experience. The 
existence of the hard problem is sometimes used as an argument for the peculiar 
or special qualities of the mental, which would substantively differentiate it from 
the physical. The corollary of this question could be ‘what is it like to learn?’, 
which brings with it the same issues around subjective interpretation. 
 
The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of qualia, of what it is like to 
experience the world; what it feels like to sense things and indeed to learn 
things. Consider different colours. When I look at a patch of red, I have a certain 
character of experience. Sure, I can differentiate red from green and blue, and 
even orange, but more than that, it looks a certain way. I can imagine an 
alternate scenario in which I call that same patch “red” but it looks to me as blue 
looks to me now. If all my colour percepts shuffled, I could imagine being able to 
describe the world with the same language, the same descriptions of similarity of 
colour, but with a vastly different subjective character of experience.  
 
Chalmers says that the problem of explaining qualia, or the subjective character 
of experience, is the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness [30]. He contrasts this 
problem to the problems tackled by methods of the cognitive sciences. For 
example, how an object reflects light that is received by our retinas and then is 
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interpreted by our brain to distinguish and identify that object is an “easy” 
problem. Why looking at a red object gives us the particular sensation of 
“redness” is the hard problem.  
 
Trying to address the hard problem returns us to the same questions raised by 
the mind-body problem, but ultimately one’s stance on this problem is somewhat 
tangential to the mind-body problem. This is an epistemological problem about 
how (and whether) we can study all the relevant aspects of our consciousness, 
rather than about the way the mind and body are related. Chalmers suggests that 
there is an explanatory gap between the functional (easy) and the experiential 
(hard) that is a nontrivial further question [30]. It is hard to imagine what kind of 
purely physical explanation would bridge this gap.  
 
Like in the mind-body problem, though not conclusively solved, there are a few 
ways people often react to this problem. There are those who think that the hard 
problem is not really a problem. Chalmers maps out these responses in a follow 
up paper [32]. The “type-A materialist” thinks that there is no hard problem; that 
there is nothing to explain over and above explaining the functions of the mind. 
Arguments for this include those by Daniel Dennett [33] and Patricia Churchland 
[34]. This position tends to line up well with eliminative materialist takes on the 
mind-body problem.  
 
The “type-B” materialist claims that there is a hard problem (that qualia are 
more than just an illusory distraction from real problems), but that it can be 
explained without appealing to the non-material. One potential way of doing this 
is to appeal to identity theories, or the idea that there is a one-to-one, 
relationship between the mental and the physical [35, 36]. With regards to the 
mind body problem, this stance suggests that the presence of a physical system 
like the brain will necessarily generate consciousness and subjective experience. 
For every state of the brain, there is a corresponding mental state and vice versa. 
However, the same criticisms to this stance on the mind-body problem apply 
here also.  
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To round out the logical space of answering the hard problem, we turn to the 
non-reductive or “positive” responses. Philosophers who take this view conclude 
that the hard problem is real, and that it is reasonable to argue for a non-
reductive stance on the mind-body problem. That is, those individuals who think 
that because it is not clear that we can objectively study all of the processes of 
the mind, there must be some aspect of it that is non-physical or, at minimum, 
not reducible to physical laws.  
 
 
The Hard Problem of Educational Neuroscience 
 
 
In discussing philosophical issues surrounding educational neuroscience, we will 
focus on the divide primarily between neuroscience and more basic sciences and 
the related humanities and social sciences, or “the big divide” [37]. As a caveat, 
the continuum of levels is not clearly delineated in reality, and many researchers 
will be, themselves, interdisciplinary by this framework. Nor will all members of 
a certain field have the same philosophical stances. However, by virtue of the 
way research is approached and undertaken, researchers make different 
assumptions about these issues [3, 4, 37, 38]. Additionally, many researchers 
have not had reason to stop and reflect on these particular questions, so may 
initially claim one view, but, upon deeper investigation, find they act with the 
assumptions of another.  
 
These differences only become clear as researchers openly discuss philosophy 
amongst colleagues outside their own discipline. Within a discipline, research 
shares some common assumptions. For example, in the natural sciences, it is 
assumed that one will investigate a limited number of dependent variables, 
holding everything constant except the causal independent variable of interest. 
On the other hand, in ecological disciplines, the context and surrounding 
“confounding” variables are often seen as essential to the question or data of 
interest, and so are purposefully uncontrolled. When these researchers work 
The Hard Problem of ‘Educational Neuroscience’ 
 13 
together, the push and pull around design and what can be reasonably concluded 
from a particular set of evidence is called into question constantly.  
 
Let us solidify these claims with some exploration of how the philosophical 
issues discussed earlier might affect researchers in educational neuroscience.  
 
Our two characters  
 
In this paper, we focus not on whether any particular viewpoint has more or less 
ground, but rather on the assertion that different disciplines have higher or 
lower concentrations of each of these viewpoints compatible with the 
assumptions made by the methods employed in each. Additionally, researchers 
themselves may not be able to defend their philosophical position as they are 
untrained in these arguments or have put little time into their point of view.  
 
To avoid inviting philosophical arguments about these positions themselves, we 
will use two individuals to serve as exemplars for the ensuing discussion. The 
first is Dr Steepleton. Dr Steepleton is a neurobiologist studying memory 
formation in neural networks using fMRI and a paradigm that asks participants 
to discriminate between vowels and consonants (among other things). When 
considering the mind-body problem, Dr Steepleton is an eliminative materialist. 
She believes that the body/brain is the only source of information about our 
personal state, and that emotional words or descriptions of our internal life are 
meaningless relics of rhetoric devices for things we don’t yet fully understand. 
She also believes that the hard problem of consciousness is, as she puts it, 
‘hornswoggle’; it is a meaningless problem and stems from our ignorance.  
 
The second is Dr Lawagon. Dr Lawagon is an education researcher studying the 
way kindergarteners learn the alphabet in preparation for learning to read. She 
does interviews with parents, students and teachers, as well as video analysis of 
student engagement with letter activities in class. In terms of the mind-body 
problem, Dr Lawagon is a dualist who thinks that there are special qualities of 
the mind that make it unable to be reduced to purely physical interactions. 
The Hard Problem of ‘Educational Neuroscience’ 
 14 
Particularly, she thinks that the hard problem of consciousness is inaccessible to 
scientific inquiry and poses a particular conundrum for educators who wish to 
shape the subjective experiences of their students.  
 
Let us presume that Dr Steepleton and Dr Lawagon attempt to undertake 
multidisciplinary research. It is conceivable (in fact, likely) that these two 
researchers will not discuss these issues of metaphysics as, at first, they assume 
that their colleague has a compatible philosophical stance (after all, researchers 
within their discipline often do) and, second, they do not think that abstract 
philosophical ideas could reasonably bear any weight on their research project. 
They are attempting to answer a research question “What is the best way to 
prepare children to learn to read?”, which has seemingly nothing to do with 
consciousness. So they continue with their joint project, unaware of how often 
this discrepancy in philosophical views causes conflict between them. 
 
The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem 
 
Remember that the hard problem of consciousness is the question of qualia - of 
what it is like to experience the world – whilst the mind-body problem is about 
the relationship between body and mind. Let us consider how philosophical 
beliefs about the hard problem of consciousness might encourage our two 
exemplar researchers to perform research differently. Dr Steepleton doesn’t 
think the hard problem is meaningful. On the other hand, Dr Lawagon sees the 
hard problem as picking out a valuable part of the learning process that is 
inaccessible to scientific methods. This causes them to approach the question of 
learning to read in different ways.  
 
Dr Steepleton comes from a philosophical stance under which changes and 
activations in the brain are the only true source of evidence about the learning 
process. Any behavioural changes, she thinks, are supervenient on and 
ultimately reducible to the neural changes. Studying the brain, in principle 
(though maybe not in practice) should leave no desired piece of the puzzle out. 
Therefore, Dr Steepleton studies patterns of brain activation to answer her 
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questions of learning. On the other hand, Dr Lawagon thinks that there are 
special mental qualities that do not reduce to the physical brains of the students 
she studies. She uses qualitative methods including subjective report, because 
she thinks that this gives her a more complete picture of the learning process. 
 
It is clear that the philosophical viewpoints of Dr Steepleton and Dr Lawagon are 
logically incompatible. However, even more significantly, and more often than 
not in collaborations like this, these philosophical assumptions are a backdrop to 
the research, which the individuals see as unquestioned (because working 
within their own field usually involves others with either compatible or 
equivalent theories) and irrelevant. While underlying each of the disciplinary 
ontologies, they are not explicitly part of the collaboration or negotiations. When 
it comes to the point of deciding the relevant or important pieces of information 
to collect from participants and interpreting the relationship between these 
measurements, as well as how to understand the results in relation to the 
overarching research question, it is likely that these researchers will disagree; 
and not for the reasons they think they are disagreeing.  
 
Assimilating language used across disciplines is often seen as a major hurdle to 
interdisciplinary collaborations [39]. Using an ambiguous word that has lay 
meanings as well as implied philosophical meanings and scientific operational 
definitions can cause confusions that are not always immediately apparent. The 
use of words like thinking, learning or consciousness [40] can easily fall into this 
trap in educational neuroscience research.   
 
Since these philosophical assumptions and use of language are often intimately 
tied to researchers’ methods and explanations, overcoming this obstacle may 
initially feel threatening. Researchers may initially react negatively to 
challenging their disciplinary assumptions and ontologies. To effectively work 
together, researchers need to face these challenges and directly communicate 
these assumptions. Through this process of discussion with colleagues, 
researchers will need to find ground on which they can build answers together, 
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with each feeling firm philosophical footing. Sometimes, this will prove too 
hopeful.  
 
While the aim of these discussions is not to change anyone’s mind, since many 
non-philosophers have not discussed these issues in detail before, researchers 
may find that they do not have reason to stand by their initial assumptions. Or 
they may feel more strongly in their convictions by the end. Navigating the 
philosophical underpinnings of their research will nonetheless make clear where 
collaboration should start so that each involved researcher feels assured in the 
chosen question and evidence the team will use to answer that question.   
 
Is there room for zombies in the classroom? Philosophical views constrain 
possibilities for knowledge in the Science of Learning 
 
The prospects for the field of Science of Learning are constrained by one’s 
philosophical stance on the accessibility of knowledge in this area. If we take the 
view that the hard problem of consciousness is a real problem, we see how it 
constrains the possible influence of neuroscience on teaching practice. All 
measures of the brain – from individual neuronal electrical spikes to global blood 
oxygen level shifts - and all measures of the subjective experience – from surveys 
to self-reports - are indirect windows to the mind. Assumptions are made on the 
basis of prior data and neural correlates, but there is no direct empirical 
evidence for the relationship between mind and brain, and there may never be 
this kind of evidence. The only source of understanding about this is through 
philosophy (empirical arguments contribute to an a forteriori conclusion). Once 
some basic assumptions about these contested relationships are established and 
made explicit, researchers can move forward in how they collectively think it 
best to answer (or not answer) the relevant questions empirically.  
 
Consider how the philosophical perspectives we address here constrain the 
prospects of the connectome project and artificial intelligence 
(www.humanconnectomeproject.org). The “human connectome project” is an 
effort to map the structural (which cells connect to which cells) and functional 
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(which areas of the brain interact/are simultaneously active when performing a 
specific cognitive task) connections in the human brain. The project is funded by 
a thirty million dollar grant by the NIH starting in 2010; a massive sum for a 
project with far reaching goals.  Presumably, knowing every single connection 
between cells in the brain and how they interact to allow for cognition will help 
us make vast strides in the field of neuroscience and brain disorders [41].  
 
Importantly, given data from the human connectome project, it should be 
possible to build a digital replica of the human brain. Using this, it will be 
possible to run simulations of various brain states and even provide the 
simulation with a proxy behavioural output, or build it into a sophisticated robot 
and watch as the robot interacts with the world. Now, depending on 
philosophical point of view, manipulations this robot could also provide 
meaningful insights into who we are [42]. Granted, this robot’s neural 
architecture would be simpler than the human brain – for example, it would lack 
the diversity of biochemical subtypes, neuronal morphologies, glial cell and 
neural vasculature functions [41]. Nevertheless, such an endeavour could 
provide fundamental understandings of what it means to be human. 
 
However, assuming it is similar enough in the important ways, would the robot 
with the connectome brain give us an ethical playing field for educational 
experimentation? The answer to this question depends on the philosophical 
assumptions one brings to the question. From a functionalist perspective, such a 
robot could be considered conscious. If the connectome robot is conscious in the 
right ways, is it ethical to experiment on it? Questions about the scope of this 
research direction become primarily ethical questions. From a dualist 
perspective, replicating the neural architecture would not entail an equivalent 
replication of the mind, and so such a project may not seem fruitful in the right 
ways. An eliminative materialist, who thinks that the whole body has to function 
together to give the right kinds of inputs and outputs, might argue that without 
all of the relevant bits, the machine would not teach us about the right things. 
Essentially, a researcher’s opinion on the scope of such a research endeavour is 
dependent on their philosophical assumptions about the underlying phenomena. 
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Some of which would not clearly be empirically answerable. Assuming a 
connectome robot could pass a Turing test, how would it be possible to 
empirically prove the existence or contents of its conscious experience?   
 
Perhaps understanding the differences between disciplinary assumptions 
regarding the mind body problem and the hard problem of consciousness gives 
an insight into why scholars disagree on the possible impact of neuroscience on 
education. Rather than how does the research community successfully translate 
knowledge, the pertinent question becomes can such a community translate 
knowledge. The answer? That depends on the philosophical views of the 
members of the community.  Again, although it is not our aim to offer concrete 
suggestions, it is important to note that some individuals may adhere to 
philosophies that all but eliminate any chance for translation whilst others may 
be flexible enough in their boundaries to allow for partial or full translation 
between different fields.  Whether or not there is a minimum threshold required 
for successful interdisciplinary work will only be established by explicit 




The Hard Problem of Translation 
 
How solving this problem becomes a problem of communication between 
disciplines and translation to applicable knowledge 
 
Fundamentally, other issues in philosophy of science are bound to constrain 
conversations about translation and the applicability of scientific explanations. 
Questions about what counts as evidence, how we can ‘prove’ something (if at 
all), or what counts as an explanation are all, whether consciously or not, directly 
influence researcher’s questions and methodologies. Of particular relevance here 
is the unity of science and reduction in the special sciences (i.e. sciences that are 
not physics). Philosophers who accept reductivism, the claim that scientific 
endeavours are importantly unified in that the laws of sciences other than 
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physics can ultimately be reduced to laws of physics, will differ in their 
understanding of the purpose of the special sciences to those who are non-
reductivist. While this kind of claim usually arises out of a stronger belief in 
substance monism, that there is only one kind of substance (usually considered 
physical), it is not necessary to endorse reductivism based purely on a 
commitment to physicalism, as Fodor [43] explains.  
 
In educational neuroscience research, this question could be reposed as whether 
it is feasible to “translate” the laws of education to laws of behavioural 
psychology, and those again to laws of cognitive neuroscience, and those again 
into cellular neuroscience and again to biochemistry, chemistry and ultimately 
down to physics. In other words, is it even possible to translate across and 
beyond the seven orders of magnitude described by Anderson [17]? Other than 
cognitive efficiency and cognitive economy for researchers, is there something 
that the higher “levels” give us that cannot be reduced to the “more basic” 
disciplines? Assuming a complete set of laws in each discipline (in practical 
terms, no such laws exist yet), should reduction be attempted, or are the 
solutions to learning available in the knowledge of each discipline as it stands 
alone? 
 
Relevant to this question is the importance of neuroscience to questions of 
psychology. The neural doctrine claims that any scientific understanding of the 
mental will come from neuroscience [44]. This claim heavily influences the 
direction and scope seen in educational neuroscience. Ultimately, it asks whether 
mental sciences other than neuroscience are merely placeholders for future 
neuroscientific theory. 
 
Meaningful prescriptive translation, that is, successfully informing teachers on 
what practices they should be exercising in the classroom is unlikely to come 
from neuroscience straight to education. Rather, success in the science of 
learning is likely to come from conceptual, functional, or diagnostic translation; 
that is, descriptive accounts and/or direct manipulation of relevant cognitive and 
cellular processes to learning [14, 18]. These descriptive and intercessory 
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processes may inspire, constrain, or describe educational practices, but will 
unlikely be able to prescribe a recipe for the best way to teach.  
 
Is Educational Neuroscience special? 
 
While we have focused on a particular set of philosophical stances on problems 
specific to the educational neuroscience collaborative mission, these issues are 
not unique to this area. Many global and social problems span the disciplinary 
boundaries and require varied methods to address. Of special relevance are 
those which require communication across the “big divide” [37], as these 
struggle with more disparate methods driven by more varied philosophical 
foundations. 
 
Prima facie, medical translation might seem like a good framework for successful 
translation of the kind we have been describing. It seems apparent that medical 
translation involves synthesis of information across broadly distinct research 
areas, albeit with an ultimate focus on biology and related methodologies. 
However, we argue that other problems, which involve disciplines other than the 
hard sciences, and tackle problems which are more obviously value-driven or 
socially and politically fraught, are where the philosophical assumptions are 
most clearly at work in causing conflict.  
 
This is primarily because the researchers’ motivations and questions of interest 
are, from the outset, very different. Consider the contrast between translation in 
medicine and translation in health. Medicine is clearly focused on mechanisms in 
the body (even considerations of things outside are concerned with how they 
impact the bodily functions). Additionally, its goal is cohesive (to save lives and 
eliminate illness); its outcomes are easily measured (how many lives saved by a 
certain practice or treatment). So despite involving research being carried out at 
multiple levels, and the sometimes difficult task of finding the appropriate bridge 
laws between these explanatory levels, this kind of collaboration is vastly easier 
than that of health.  
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The multidisciplinary problem of health encompasses all of medicine with the 
addition of value-laden questions about quality of living (including dignity, 
autonomy, mental health), patient care, attitudes towards disability, an 
individual’s participation in society, political issues of payment for treatment etc. 
It is the broader question of how do we stay healthy and encourage health in 
society. Researchers likely come to these questions with many different 
motivations, and from all disciplinary backgrounds. Social scientists, biologists, 
doctors, philosophers, politicians, and economists will all be involved, and will 
bring with them the philosophical baggage of their discipline. Communication 
and translation across these disciplines will be much more difficult than in 
medicine.   
 
Like health [45-47], there are many other areas of broad interdisciplinary 
collaboration that involve such disparate research ontologies. These include 
questions of ecology and conservation [3, 48], geography [49], international 
affairs [50, 51], agriculture and biotechnology [52] and, of course, the science of 
learning [5, 11]. There would be equally fraught philosophical assumptions 
embedded in the practices of each of these interdisciplinary projects. 
 
How can we address this? 
 
Once again, the aim of this piece is not to solve philosophical disputes – it is 
merely to highlight the important and often overlooked role they may play in 
interdisciplinary work.  With that said, there are a couple tools researchers can 
utilize to facilitate discussions surrounding these issues early in the translation 
process. Eigenbrode et al. [4] give a framework for workshops around 
philosophical assumptions in interdisciplinary teams. Questions include those of 
motivation and the role of basic research, describing and evaluating the 
traditional scientific method, defining evidence, the existence and role of truth in 
research, the value placed on replication, defining knowledge, the value and 
possibility for objectivity, the unity of science and the relationship between 
phenomena in the various disciplines [4].  
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In addition, Donoghue & Horvath [53] offer a concrete framework through which 
interdisciplinary teams can locate and understand each other’s work.  Based on 
an abstracted-systems model, this framework does not solve issues of 
philosophical disagreement – rather, it makes it easy to frame research from 
differing fields within specific levels so as to clarify what assumptions varying 
researchers are likely to utilize to drive their research, data, and explanations.  In 
addition, this framework suggests that effective prescriptive translation need 
only traverse adjacent levels of organization.  This eases the burden placed on 
individuals from highly disparate fields (e.g. – cellular neuroscience and 
education) and requires conversations and accommodations be made only at the 
interfaces between adjacent fields (e.g. – cellular neuroscience and systems 
neuroscience).  
 
Other than encouraging discussion of this type, we provide no other solutions to 
the mismatched philosophical assumptions, as this will rely on the dynamics and 
values of the specific interdisciplinary team. It is important that these 
discussions come in the preparatory phases of the research collaboration, as 
these issues may only become apparent in the interpretation of results, which 
may have been resolved earlier with a stronger design, which more fully 
addresses the questions of interest for all parties.  Though these conversations 
may be difficult, they do not negate any possibility of successful interdisciplinary 
collaboration.  Any issues of philosophical disagreement can ultimately have an 
effective arbitrator in the elucidation of and reference to concrete outcomes and 
goals established early in the project development phase.  By deferring to these 
established goals, disagreements can be seen as guides as to how to proceed in 





Given that there are many valuable ways of knowing and different disciplines are 
at least currently epistemologically irreducible, in cases where different 
disciplines study the same subject matter, disparate disciplines have good 
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reasons to work together. However, it is an empirical truth that different 
disciplines make different assumptions about metaphysics and epistemology 
around these subject matters, which likely leads to their different preferred 
methodologies and definitions of evidence. Since many researchers do not see 
these philosophical issues as central to the interdisciplinary subject matter at 
hand, they fail to talk about these important issues. This causes conflicts that are 
seemingly about interpretive language, methods or results, but actually stem 
from these deeper philosophical assumptions. The solution is to communicate 
directly and transparently about these issues at the outset and iteratively in the 
process of interdisciplinary collaboration. Along with others, we argue for 
confronting disciplinary assumptions in order to foster truly integrated 
interdisciplinary projects [3, 4, 38]. To resolve the conflicts and develop a more 
inclusive and productive form of collaboration, researchers should exercise 
philosophical dialogue with their interdisciplinary peers.  
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